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William III and the Legalist Revolution
RICHARD S. KAY*
One doesn't have to be a deconstructionist to understand that people
and things are full of surprising complexities. Hugh Macgill is no excep-
tion: a passionate believer in the essential equal worth of human beings
with an amused affection for Confederate history; a consistent seeker after
institutional innovation with a strong sense of the value of tradition; a
stickler for parliamentary form and personal courtesy with a genius for
informal and direct communication. It is the complicated coexistence of
such disparate preferences and talents, of course, that has enabled him to
make the extraordinary contributions to the improvement of this school
from which so many of us have benefited. -
A symposium dedicated to the paradoxical idea of rebellious leader-
ship, therefore, is a particularly apt way to honor Dean Macgill's tenure.
This phrase also captures a notion that is especially fruitful when applied to
basic questions of constitutional structure and political value. Every legal
system rests, at the end, on a set of political assumptions. Every instance
of law, that is, is ultimately supported by something that is not law. When,
as inevitably happens, there develops a fundamental disharmony between
the artifacts of law and the political values of a society the law will have to
give way. When this phenomenon occurs-at least when it occurs
abruptly-we call it a revolution.1
There thus appears to be a fundamental opposition between law and
revolution. But the same people and the same events may exhibit an affin-
ity for both notions. Since every legal system must refer either explicitly
or implicitly to its alegal source, every invocation of law is, at the same
time, a kind of implementation of the original revolutionary act. Some-
what less obviously even revolutionaries may demonstrate an attachment to
law--even to the law of the constitutional system they are destroying.
A case in point is the English Revolution of 1688-89. In that Revolu-
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tion, King James II lost his throne after an invasion force of about 15,000
men landed in England under the command of the king's Dutch nephew
and son-in-law, William, Prince of Orange. William's venture was sup-
ported and joined by significant English political and military forces.
James, a Roman Catholic, had made himself profoundly unpopular by his
policy of tolerating and promoting the interest of Catholics and by ignoring
legal restrictions on the capacity of Catholics to hold office or to practice
their religion. James fled the country and an ad hoc Convention consisting
of an assembly of peers and an irregularly elected House of Commons de-
clared that the king had "abdicated" and offered the crown jointly to Wil-
liam and his wife, Princess Mary, the daughter of King James. The politi-
cal grievances against James turned on his unilateral exercises of state
power. As such, the Revolution marked a significant turn toward the rec-
ognition of an indispensable role for Parliament in the great decisions of
the kingdom. This understanding was reflected in the promulgation of the
Declaration of Rights as part of the offer of the throne to William and
Mary.
2
The point about the Revolution I wish to stress is its inescapable ille-
gality. There are many uses of the term "law." But the events of 1688-
1689 were at odds with almost all of them. If there was one feature of the
English constitution to which the statesmen of that period expressed more
attachment than any other it was the principle of hereditary succession.
The Whig lawyer, Henry Pollexfen, William's first Attorney-General and
then Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas declared in the first post-
revolution Parliament that "[a]ll men love their Monarchy, and if you make
men believe that it is elective, you will catch a great many. No man ever
dreamed of this."3 Yet the central event of the Revolution was the depos-
ing of a king who held the throne by undoubted hereditary right and the
substitution of an unprecedented joint monarchy by two members of the
royal family who were second and fourth in the line of succession. No
amount of obfuscation could conceal this clear act of revolution.
Nevertheless the revolutionaries of 1688-89 strove mightily to make
their actions appear to conform with existing law. In part this was dictated
by the underlying political charges they leveled against James II. His of-
fenses were largely framed as violations of the law. The Declaration of
Rights announced that thelking and his counsellors "did endeavour to Sub-
vert and extirpate the Protestant Religion, and the Lawes and Liberties of
2. For a good summary history of the Revolution, see W. A. SPECK, RELucTANT REVoLU.
TIONARIES: ENGLISHMEN AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 (1988). On the Declaration of Rights, see
Lois G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 1689 (1981).
3. 9 PARL. HiST. ENO. 63 (1688) (Grey's Debates), reprinted In DAVID LEws JONES, A
PAuLrAmENTARY HISTORY OF THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 159 (1988).
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the Kingdome.' A Having justified the Revolution by the illegality of the
king's behavior they were surely uncomfortable in dwelling on the illegal-
ity of their own. Even beyond this, they were, for the most part, genuinely
committed to the maintenance of legal continuity. Most of them were
willing to chance the breach but wished to do so-insofar as they were
able-under a cloak of legal justification.
The critical central figure in this enterprise was William IH, Prince of
Orange. By the time his fleet sailed, he was determined to settle for noth-
ing less than the crown itself. But he was an unlikely revolutionary.
Surely he was skeptical of the idea that governments must respond to the
changing preferences of the population. He was a strong monarchist and
attached a great importance to his own claim to a hereditary sovereignty-
the tiny principality of Orange. He premised his invasion of England in
part on a right to protect his and his wife's patrimony! He had little
patience with the intricacies of constitutional form. He had been
repeatedly frustrated as Stadhouder of the United Provinces by the
elaborate rules for consultation with, and consent from, the various
representative institutions of the Netherlands! Once established in
England he resisted parliamentary efforts to whittle down the prerogative.
He complained that the laws of England gave the king "the power to
destroy the nation and not to protect it.'
Indeed it is generally conceded that apart from the impetus of personal
ambition, William's reasons for invading England were not constitutional,
but military and diplomatic. William was engaged in a lifelong conflict
with Louis XIV of France. The expansion of the Sun King's empire con-
tinually threatened to devour the Netherlands. At the time of the revolution
William was assembling a tenuous alliance of the United Provinces, Spain,
the Holy Roman Empire and certain German states. But the power of this
alliance to resist France was a matter of doubt. England, ostensibly neu-
tral, was pivotal in determining the balance of forces. Should James
openly ally with France, the risk to the rest of Europe would be measurably
increased. Should England adhere to the anti-French coalition, a formida-
4. THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS see. 1, introduction (Eng. 1689), reprinted in SCOwOERR,
supra note 2, app.2 at 299 [hereinafter DECLARATION].
5. There is a continuing dispute over exactly when William decided to seek the crown. See
SpEcK, supra note 2, at 74-75; see also STEPIHN B. BAXTER, WILLIAM III 223-24 (1966). But all
agree he had a settled determination after December 11, 1988, when King James 11 fled to France. See,
e.g., ROBERT BEDDARD, A KINGDOM WITHOUT A KING 33 (1988).
6. See BAXrER, szpra note 5, at 227 (His wife's support for the invasion was more strongly moti-
vated by a desire to "preserve her claim to the throne."); see also Tony Claydon, Wlliam lii's Dela-
ration of Reasons and the Glorious Revolution, 39 HIST. J. 87, 98-99 (1996) (noting that William
ventured to England to secure the balance of power between Catholicism and Protestantism In Europe
but might also have had an interest in the throne).
7. See, e.g., BAXTER, stpra note 5, at 189.
8. Id at 270.
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ble military force was possible.9
Whatever his real motives, however, the political circumstances of
England made anything but a legal defense impossible. Of course the brute
facts of invasion and the necessarily irregular means by which the new
government was established made the construction of such legal justifica-
tion a challenging task. But at almost every point the new king sought to
deal with the issues confronting him in a way which could maintain at least
a colorable claim to legality. Even as he bemoaned the irrational strictures
of English law he insisted a king of England must govern by law "if hee
hath conscience."' 1
In this paper, I will offer some illustrations of the way in which the
preference for legality manifested itself at every step. Thus the convention
which effected the settlement was depicted as a parliament, and the instal-
lation of Queen Mary as a co-sovereign was a concession to her somewhat
stronger legal claim to the crown. The new king recoiled from suggestions
that he declare himself a conqueror, and his regime deviated from such
legal protection as habeas corpus with the greatest reluctance. When accu-
rate statements of the revolutionary character of the new regime were ut-
tered, they were quickly squelched. The oaths of allegiance constructed for
the new government were designed especially to soothe the conscience of
its legalistic adherents.
The legalist tone of the Revolution and the new government was set
even before the Dutch fleet set sail from Helvoetsluys. On September
thirtieth William published in the Hague a Declaration justifying his action.
This document, partly drafted by the Anglican clergyman and future
Bishop of Salisbury, Gilbert Burnet, reads like a bill of indictment of the
king. Over and over William recounts the violations of law committed by
James. He condemns the king's "Evil Counsellors" who, as it was later to
be stated in the Declaration of Rights "endeavor[ed] to Subvert and extir-
pate the Protestant Religion and the Lawes and Liberties of this King-
dome.""H The king's dispensing with statutes is something those counsel-
lors "pretend [is] according to law."'12 The decision of the court of King's
Bench in which the king's dispensing and suspending authority was upheld
is mocked "as if it were in the power of the Twelve Judges to offer up the
Laws, Rights and Liberties of the whole nation to the king."'3 The Decla-
9. See generally STUART E. PRALL, THE BLOODLESS REVOLUTION: ENGLAND 1688 166-80 (Univ.
of Wis. Press 1985) (1972).
10. BAXTER, supra note 5, at270.
11. DECLARATION, supra note 4, see. 1, introduction.
12. The Prince of Orange's First Declaration, 1688, 4 James 2 (Eng.), reprinted In 5 COBBETr'S
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 2 (William Cobbett ed., London, R. Bagshaw 1809) [herein-
after Declaration (COBBErr's)].
13. Id; see also The Trial of Sir Edward Hales (Godden v. Hales) (1686), 2 James 2 (Eng.), re-
printed in I 1 COBBETr's COMPLETE COLLETION OF STATE TRIALS 1166 (T. B. Howell cd., London,
R. Bagshaw 1811).
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ration, moreover, states William's objectives to be merely the restoration
of law by the assembly of a free and legal Parliament, something it claims
the king's counsellors thwarted because they knew that they would then be
brought to an account for all their open violations of law. 14 The contrast
the Declaration draws is between the outlawry of James II and the order
and regularity of the rule of law. William urged Englishmen to support
him so
we may prevent all those miseries which must needs follow upon
the nation's being kept under arbitrary government and slavery,
and that all violences and disorders, which may have overturned
the whole Constitution of the English g overnment, may be fully
redressed in a free and legal parliament.
But even if he were fully determined to act by law it was clearly im-
possible to follow that course and still achieve the ends for which the de-
scent on England was undertaken. Some of the difficulties arose immedi-
ately in connection with William's pledge to secure a legal parliament. On
December twenty-third, James made his second, and this time successful,
flight from England. While, in many ways, the departure of the king sim-
plified matters for William, it seriously complicated his plans for a new
"lawful" parliament. That is because under accepted law a genuine Par-
liament consisted of the king, the Lords and the Commons. The House of
Lords could meet only on a summons from the king and the members of a
House of Commons could be elected only on the king's writ. James had
reputedly dropped the Great Seal of England into the Thames, in part, for
the purpose of frustrating any attempts to convene a parliament. A few
days before his departure he told the French ambassador that
The Prince of Orange... will find himself very much embarrassed
what form of government to establish. The meeting of a Parlia-
ment cannot be authorised without writs under the great seal, and
they have been issued for fifteen counties only; the others are
burned: the great seal is missing. The Chancellor had placed it in
my hands eight days before I went away. They cannot make an-
other without me. All this will create difficulties and incidents,
which afford me occasion to take suitable measures.
16
That James was astute in this strategy is shown by William's reaction
to a proposal formulated in two meetings of his supporters in Hungerford
on December eighth and ninth. They suggested demanding that James re-
14. See Declaration (COBBETr'S), supra note 12, at 8.
15. Id. at I1.
16. 2 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF HENRY HYDE, EARL OF CLARENDON 226 (Sanuel Wcller Singer,
ed., London, Henry Colburn 1828) (quoting M. INAZuRE, HISTOIRE DE LA REOwmON 264) [hrain-
after CLARENDON CORRESPONDENCE].
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call the new writs for a parliamentary election that had been issued. (This
may have been motivated by a belief that a delayed election would favor
the Whigs.!7) William refused to assent to such a request and would not
even hear arguments supporting it. "By your favor, Sir Harry," he replied
to Sir Henry Capel, "we may drive away the king; but perhaps we may not
know how easily to come by a Parliament.""8  The same Fproposal was
made in a second meeting and the prince again objected to it.'
Any possibility of an authentic parliament summoned on the writs of
James II was made impossible by the sabotage of the escaping king. But
the effort the revolutionaries devoted to approximating such a body tells us
something about the value they put on legal form. The debate on the way
to secure a parliament in these circumstances took place, at the outset, in an
ad hoc assembly of peers that had convened to take charge of the govern-
ment after the first attempted escape of the king.20 The most obvious and
most certainly legal alternative was also the most impractical. That was to
call back the king to issue genuine writs for a new election. The Earl of
Nottingham suggested that the king be called back on the understanding
that the new parliament would establish safeguards against future royal
arbitrariness and on the express condition that its members would be ab-
solved from their oaths of allegiance should the king fail to cooperate.21 A
second possible expedient anticipated the ultimate settlement by treating
James' departure as a "demise in law." 2 In that event, the Princess Mary
would automatically assume the throne and she would be able to call the
new Parliament into being.23 Finally, it was proposed to use the writs is-
sued by King James. The king had ordered the writs destroyed but enough
survived to elect 184 members u Those legally chosen members could
then provide for the election of the remainder. 5 None of these devices was
acceptable as a legal solution. The last two posed problems of legality
almost as serious as those associated with a convention. The first, while
impeccable as a matter of law, was a political impossibility.
17. See HENRY HoRWrrz, PARLIAMENT, POLICY, AND PoLrIcs IN TH REIGN OF WILLIAM III 6
(1977).
18. CLARENDON CORRESPONDENCE, supra nOte 16, at 222.
19. See a.
20. See generally ROBERT BEDDARD, A KINGDOM WITHOUT A KING 36-41 (1988) (describing the
"provisional government" in place after James U's flight from London).
21. See J.R. WESTERN, MONARCHY AND REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH STATE IN THE 1680's 300
(1972).
22. HENRY HORwrrz, REVOLUTION POLmCKs: THE CAREER OF DANIEL FINCH, SECOND 1EARL OF
NOTrINGHAM, 1647-1730, at68 (1968).
23. See Id at 70. Mary was the rightful heir to the throne if the baby Prince of Wales, born the
previous summer were, as was widely-but almost certainly wrongly-assumed, a "supposiflous" heir
intended to defraud the country into a Catholic dynasty. See PRALL, supra note 9, at 167-68.
24. See HORwrrz, supra note 22, at 68.
25. See CLARENDON CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 16, at 236; DAVID LEwis JONES, A PAR-
LIAMENTARY HISTORY OF THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 10 (1988).
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Consequently, it was agreed that the Prince of Orange should be asked
to issue circular letters for the election of a convention. On Christmas Day
the Lords took their request to the prince, asking, as well, that he take
charge of the administration of the government. But he deferred respond-
ing until he had the advice of another body. On the twenty-third he had
called together an assembly consisting of all of the local men who had sat
in the Parliaments of Charles II (significantly, not the members of the
compliant Parliament of James convened in 1685), the Lord Mayor and
Aldermen of London and fifty members of the Common Council. As in
the case of the irregular assembly of Lords, William asked this group for
suggestions on the way to call a free Parliament. This mock House of
Commons met in the Commons chamber on December twenty-sixth, the
day after the Lords had made their address and they acquiesced in its rec-
ommendations. 26
These two groups that initiated the call for the convention exhibit the
schizophrenic character of the Revolution. On the one hand, nothing could
be clearer than their non-legal character. The Lords met on their own ini-
tiative, not on a summons from the monarch. The "Commons" were not
called by the king, and whatever past or present official status they held
was in no way equivalent to that of real members of Parliament. On the
other hand, they behaved very much like houses of Parliament, electing
officers (including the appointment of eminent lawyers to advise them in
place of the judges), and following parliamentary procedures.27 William
was not content with the assent of the Lords to the calling of a convention.
He insisted, as well, on the agreement of a representative group of com-
moners, thus crudely mirroring a true parliamentary action.
The tension between the desire to maintain some resemblance to ordi-
nary legal form and the need to accomplish the substantive business of the
Revolution was also evident in the procedures employed to elect the con-
vention. The election departed in numerous details from the standard pro-
cedure for choosing a parliament. Sustained efforts of the last two kings to
remodel the constituencies so as to assure the election of members friendly
to the court had made many of the local officers who would ordinarily su-
pervise the elections untrustworthy. Consequently, William's letters to the
counties were addressed not, as was usual, to the Sheriffs, but to the Coro-
ners; and the letters to the boroughs, cities and cinque-ports were addressed
to "an ambiguously named 'Chief Magistrate."' As the clergy were also
suspect, the letters were not published in the churches but in the market
towns. Concessions were also made to the urgency of the situation by
shortening the period during which the letters were to be posted. Moreo-
26. See JONES, supra note 25, at 11-12.
27. See hi; ScHWOERER , spra note 2, at 133.
28. Sc'woERw4, supra note 2, at 137.
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ver, the usual forty day period of notice was waived to allow the conven-
tion to assemble earlier.29 In fact, the letters were issued on December
twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth, only two days after the ad hoc assemblies'
request, and the Convention met on January twenty-second. 30 These pro-
cedures, as Lois Schwoerer has pointed out, reveal William's "pains to
preserve legal procedures."
3' I
The deviations in procedure were nothing in comparison to the princi-
pal defect of the election: the fact that it was called by "circular letters"
from the Prince of Orange and not by writs issued by the king of England
under the Great Seal. It was impossible to forget that the convention could
not be a Parliament. Indeed, the very choice of the word "convention,"
which was used by William and the houses themselves, betokened a recog-
nition of the irregular character of that body. The term had already been
used for some time to signify an assembly lacking the prerequisites of a
legal Parliament. Early in the century it had been asserted that if the
Houses of Lords and Commons met without passing a bill for royal assent
there was, in law, no session. That rule was relevant in a 1623 case in
which the judges had to apply a statute that declared it would be in force
until the end of the next session of Parliament. In deciding that that period
would not include a meeting where no bill had been passed, the judges said
such an assembly "is but a Convention and no Parliament or Session."
32
The same word was used regularly through the interregnum of the 1650s
by those who wished to argue that Cromwell's various legislative experi-
ments lacked the status of a genuine parliament.
33
The Houses of Lords and Commons that met in 1660 to effect the res-
toration of Charles II, like the convention of 1689, lacked the critical le-
gitimating authority of royal writs. Nevertheless, the members never re-
ferred to themselves as anything but a Parliament.34 In popular usage,
however, that body soon became known as a convention. One pamphlet
writer in that year distinguished it as a "convention" lacking the "right con-
stitution of a parliament" '35 and, in response, another writer defended "the
parliament whom he maliciously calleth a convention."3 6 Gilbert Burnet
referred to it as "the new parliament, or convention as it afterwards came to
be called, because it was not summoned by the king's writ."37 Although
29. See id.
30. See JAMES REESE JONES, THE REVOLUToN OF 1688 iN ENGLAND 312 (1972).
31. SCHWOERER, supra note 2, at 139.
32. J. Franklin Jameson, The Early Political Uses of the Word Convention, 3 AM. HIST. REV. 477,
480 (1898) (quoting HurTroN, REPORTS 61 (1656)).
33. See id at 482-85.
34. See id at 481.
35. Id at 481 (quoting a 1660 pamphlet entitled The Valley of Baca).
36. ld (quoting A Scandalous Pamphlet Answered, reprinted in 7 SOMERS TRACTS 399401, 486
(Walter Scott ed., 1809-15)).
37. Id. (quoting 1 GILBERT BURNEr, HISTORY OF MYOWN TIME 160 (1900)).
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that 1660 convention had, as its first act, enacted a statute declaring that
"the Lords and Commons now sitting at Westminster in this present Par-
liament, are the two Houses of Parliament notwithstanding any want of the
Kings Majesties Writt,"38 the doubts attaching to its status were such that it
was felt necessary to pass a confirming act in the next Parliament, ratifying
its actions. In contrast to the Convention Parliament's own declaratory act,
however, the subsequent Parliament which, having been called by the king,
was beyond any scruple of legality, carefully avoided using the term "Par-
liament" to describe the convention, referring only to "[t]he Lords and
Commons being assembled att Westminster... in the Twelfth yeare of His
Majesties Reigne."39 The illegality of the 1689 Convention is highlighted
by the fact that the more radical authors of 1688-89 embraced the irregu-
larity as the predicate to establishing a fundamental constitutional settle-
ment. Such writers often positively despised the idea of a mere Parliament,
much preferring a genuine "convention. 
°
For the men in control of events, however, this anomaly was to be
minimized if not denied. The Prince of Orange had little interest in exer-
cising any pre-legal authority to reshape the constitution. Those prefer-
ences were also revealed in his insistence on the meeting of some kind of
parliament and on his reluctance to accept the crown except on the invita-
tion of some body that might claim constitutional license to offer it.
Shortly after his arrival in England, several of his supporters had argued for
such a course. Having landed in England with a large armed force, having
turned back the army of his opponent, and having triumphantly made his
way to the seat of government while King James fled the country, it natu-
rally occurred to some of his supporters that the Prince should simply as-
sume power in the time-honored way of conquerors. After King James's
first departure, Henry Pollexfen, a leading Whig lawyer, told the Earl of
Clarendon that William "had nothing to do, but in the head of his army to
declare himself king.' 1 A contemporary reported that several of the
"greatest lawyers" had urged the same course on William after his arrival
in London.
4 2
It was, of course, hard to deny that, as a matter of brute fact, many a
dynasty had originated in conquest and English history provided no excep-
tion. But this raw reality was difficult for the legalist statesmen of the later
seventeenth century to accept in its unvarnished form. This was especially
the case in 1689 in light of the vehemence of the charges of illegal conduct
lodged against the late king. To the extent those charges were phrased as
38. Statutes ofthe Realin, 1660. 12 Car. 2, ch. 1 (Eng.).
39. Statutes ofthe Realm, 1661, 13 Car. 2, ch. 7 (Eng.).
40. See RiCHARD ASHCRAFr, REVOUTroNARY PoL-ncs & Loce's Two TREATISES OF
GovaNMENT 566-67 (1986).
41. CLARENDON CORRESPONDENCF, supra note 16, rt 225.
42. See SCHWOERER, supra note 2, at 132 (quoting Roger Morice).
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undermining the "original contract" or the "ancient constitution," the his-
torical fact of the 1066 conquest was a troublesome issue. J.G.A. Pocock
has demonstrated the serious threat the Conquest posed to the idea of im-
memorial rights. The conquest left "an indelible stain of sovereignty on
the English constitution." 43 Any subsequent liberties would, in their origin,
be matters not of fundamental law but of royal grace. The risks associated
with such a slender constitutional root were so great that the response was
a mass historical delusion. The Conquest, it turned out, was no conquest at
all. William I took the crown not by mere force but by lawfully authorized
"trial by battle" and he, therefore, took it within an established system of
law whose limitations he and his successors regularly confirmed."
The theories of conquest offered to William III in 1688 and 1689, were
similarly bowdlerized. Two refinements of the idea were current at the
Revolution: the conquest as a sign of divine sanction for the actions of the
Prince and the conquest as a just response to illegitimate action by James
II, authorized by the law of nations.
The first version depicted the conquest not as a legitimating event in
itself but as a sign that William's enterprise was an instrument of God's
providence. This victory in particular was so extraordinary that it could
only be explained as a divine intervention. The most celebrated exposition
of this view was published by the cleric William Sherlock, explaining his
1690 decision to adhere to the new regime after a period of public resis-
tance. His Case ofAllegiance appeared only after William had prevailed at
the Boyne. This sealed the success of the new regime and permitted Sher-
lock to argue that the "thorough settlement" of the Revolution signified
God's approval. This understanding mitigated the crude notion of simple
conquest, as God could not be expected to have endorsed the imposition of
an unjust and tyrannical government
4 5
But such an explanation was open to obvious difficulties. It pinned
legitimacy on the caprices of warfare. "The Revolution is supposed to be
right," wrote Samuel Johnson, "because at Torbay the wind chopped
about." More pointedly it read God's approval into the success of every
tyrant. If it made submission to William's government proper it equally
justified obedience to Cromwell's. It reduced legitimacy to a matter of
"might makes right." As such it was little improvement over the doctrine
of the right of conquest simpliciter.4
The second reformulation of the theory of conquest relied on the writ-
ings of continental jurists who had attempted to specify the conditions un-
der which the use of force against states and governments could be justi-
43. J.GA. PococK, THE ANcIENT CoNsTrTION AND THE UDAL LAw 53 (1957).
44. See HOwARD NENNEIR, BY COLOUR OF LAW 101-03 (1977); POCOCY, supra note 43, pawim.
45. See J.P. KENYON, REVOLUnON P NCILES 26-29 (1977).
46. See id at 24-28.
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fled. Those conditions were denominated rules of thejus gentium, the law
of nations. Some English writers of the time cited to the work of Grotius
on the just war. Edmund Bohun, for example, applied Grotius' rules to the
circumstances of England in 1688-89. The attempts of a monarch to usurp
the power of the legislature or to transgress the limits of his authority de-
prived him of the right to allegiance and converted the action of a foreign
prince to depose him from an unlawful aggression to the vindication of a
just and lawful cause.47 By measuring the conquest against a set of abstract
rules about the just conduct of princes, this position seemed to invite other
sovereigns to examine the constitutionality of the behavior of the English
king, an unsettling prospect to English statesmen interesting in establishing
a stable regime.
William, at any rate, was apparently not satisfied to take a title by con-
quest. Indeed, what king-to-be, looking forward to a long reign, would not
be worried by such a notion? No such idea was expressed in the debates
on the offer of the crown nor in the instruments by which it was offered. Its
unacceptability was shortly demonstrated in the parliamentary reaction to
the publication, in 1693, of an anonymous tract (the author was Charles
Blount, a radical Whig and iconoclast) entitled King William and Queen
Mary, Conquerors in which a 'just conquest" defense of the Revolution
was set forward. Edmund Bohun, now licensor of the press, not surpris-
ingly, found it suitable for publication. The reaction to the piece was swift
and decisive. The author being unknown, Bohun was called before the
House of Commons which demanded his removal from office. The book
was ordered burned by the common hangman, on the grounds that it was
"highly injurious to their majesties rightful title to the crown of this realm,
and inconsistent with the principles, on which this government is founded,
and tending to the subversion of the rights of the people.A9 At about the
same time, Pastoral Letter by Bishop Burnet, written in 1689, suggesting
the same theme was also ordered burned, and Burnet himself was the sub-
ject of an unsuccessful demand for impeachment 5 If the idea of a rightful
conquest was unacceptable in 1689, in 1693, four years into a now rea-
sonably well settled reign, it appeared positively dangerous.
Such scruples for legality, however, had their limits as became clear
when the exact nature of William's accession to power became an issue.
As already noted, the more "legal" resolution of the change in regime
47. See id at 31; Mark Goldie, EdmndBohun and Jus Genflum In tLh Re'oluton Debate, 1689-
1693,20 HIST. J. 569, 578-80 (1977).
48. See 3 THOMAS BABING"ON MACAUEAY, HISORY OF ENGLAND 636-40 (Heron Books 1967)
(1848-61).
49. IP. Thompson, The Idea of Conquest in Conrov kes Oavr tAe 1688 Revoluaton 33 . HIST.
IDEAS 33,45 (1977); see also 3 MACAULAY, supra note 48, at 639-40; Goldie, supra note 47, a 574.
50. See 3 MACAULAY, supra note 48, at 640-42.
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would have had Princess Mary ascend to the throne in her own right,"' and
there was a small but important faction at the Convention that advocated
such a course. It was, perhaps, the neatest solution available to revolution-
aries committed to maintaining at least the form of the existing constitu-
tion. It required merely the distortion of fact in connection with James'
intentions in leaving the country and the birth of his son. Neither of these
fictions was, in the context of that time, particularly hard to swallow. But
it foundered on an insoluble problem. William of Orange let it be known
that he would settle for nothing less than both the power and the title of
king. It should be noted that William, himself, had something of a legal
claim to the succession as the nephew of the king, and was, in fact, next in
line after his wife and the Princess Anne. He had, at one time, believed his
right superior to their's on the ground that James's marriage to their
mother, Anne Hyde, a commoner, should have been incapable of produc-
ing children with any claim to the throne. Only after he decided that such a
claim was unsustainable in English law had he agreed to marry Princess
Mary.52 In fact, at the time of the Convention it was argued in some pam-
phlets (assuming a kind of Salic law) that his position as the closest male
heir gave him the right to the succession.5 3  William also might have
claimed the throne as part of his wife's marital estate, but the precedents of
applying this property rule of the common law to the special case of the
crown were decidedly mixed.5 4 None of these arguments were really plau-
sible and William, himself, never relied on any of them in demanding or
accepting the crown.
Nevertheless, at a meeting with key members of the House of Lords on
February third, he expressed clearly his unwillingness to take any part in
the English government that did not include the royal title. He would not
oppose the settlement of the crown on Mary. Crowns, he told them, had no
"charms" to him, but he "would hold no power dependent upon the will of
a woman." 5 He thus confirmed what a Dutch associate had told several
members of the convention, some days earlier, the prince "would not like
to be his wife's gentleman usher., 56 Should the convention refuse him the
title he would return to Holland, "happy in the consciousness of the serv-
51. Another alternative favored by the more law-minded revolutionaries-the establishment of a
"regency" for an incapacitated King James-was defeated in the Convention by a narrow vote. See
JONES, supra note 25, at 22-23.
52. See BAXTER, supra note 5, at 129, 223-24; Howard Nenner, Pretense and Pragmatism: the
Response to Uncertainty in the Succession Crisis of 1689, in TH REVOLUTION OF 1688-1689, at 83, 93
(Lois G. Schwoerer ed., 1992); Lois G. Schwoerer, Images of Queen Mary 11, 1689-95, 42
RENAISSANCE Q. 717, 727 (1989).
53. See Nenner, supra note 52, at 93.
54. See id
55. PRALL, supra note 9, at 272.
56. 2 THOMAS BABiNOToN MACAULAY, HSTORY OF ENGLAND 377 (Heron Books 1967) (1848-
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ices he had endeavoured, though in vain, to do" for England 7 William's
reasons for this position rested, however, on more than personal ambition
or pride. He deemed it critical to secure his position for life. Should Mary
predecease him, she would be succeeded by her sister, Princess Anne, and
William's influence would be at an end.58 His foresight in this regard was
accurate as the queen died at the end of 1694, and William survived her for
more than seven years during which time the military and political balance
in Europe was critically changed.59
Given the Prince's position, any hope of saving the appearance of he-
reditary succession by conferring the crown on Princess Mary was
doomed. Revolutionaries of all constitutional persuasions aw§eed that the
leadership of William in the new settlement was essential. Indeed the
issue was made moot when the Princess sent a letter to the Earl of Danby
declaring her intention to refuse the title unless William were also made
king.61 Since, by refusing to renounce her own right, Mary might also have
blocked succession by her sister, this effectively removed a hereditary so-
lution from the table. The (barely) plausible claim of Mary was made un-
available to the revolutionaries except in tandem with the plainly implausi-
ble claim of William.
The result was the curious institution of the "dual monarchy" whereby
William and Mary were made joint king and queen-he a king regnant and
she a queen regnant-neither merely a consort. This unprecedented and
never repeated device was made workable in operation by a proviso in the
offer of the throne stipulating that the sole exercise of the regal power was
to be vested in the king. While it failed to eliminate a number of practical
problems this solution nicely captures the conflicting tendencies of legal
form and political necessity that characterized the Revolution: Mary with
the superior legal claim, representing legality;, William, the indispensable
political actor, representing overriding substantive necessity.
Two incidents in the early years of the new government illustrate how
intent it was on avoiding any taint of revolutionary lawlessness. In No-
vember, 1689 Sir Joseph Tredenham reported to the House of Commons
that "major-general Ludlow is come into England."0 The reference was to
Edmund Ludlow. A veteran of the Parliamentary and Commonwealth ar-
mies, he had twice commanded the English forces in Ireland. He was
57. PRALL, supra note 9, at272.
58. See BAXrER, supra note S, at247.
59. See JOHN WROUGHToN, THE STUART AGE: 1603-1714,26,28,84-85 (1997).
60. See H.C. FoxcRoFr, TmE LIFE AND LETTERs OF SIR GEORGE SAVnA BAR., FMsT hAQuis
OFHALIFAX 51 (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1968) (1898).
61. See ScHWOERER, supra note 2, at 219-20.
62. See HOWARD NENNER, THE RIGHT TO BE KING 177-83 (1995) (dsesing the char,er of th
joint monarchy).
63. 5 PARL.HIST. ENG. 412(1689).
among the most radical of the prominent republicans. On being asked by
Cromwell what would satisfy him, he is reported to have replied: "[T]hat
which we fought for, that the nation might be governed by its own con-
sent."64 He was a member of the High Court of Justice that decreed the
execution of Charles I and on the Restoration had fled to exile in Switzer-
land. Now in 1689, aged seventy-two and one of the last surviving regi-
cides, he returned to England for the purpose, as he told the magistrates of
Vevey, of "strengthen[ing] the hands of our Gideon, who is miraculously
raised up to deliver us from the house of bondage."65 In his memoirs Lud-
low indicated that he had been summoned by the new government to assist
in the reduction of Ireland and there is at least one contemporary account
tending the same way.66 But, as Barbara Taft concludes in the most ex-
tended study of the incident, this "report is neither substantiated nor plausi-
ble': in lih~t of William's documented fear and distaste for English republi-
canism.
Whatever his original inclination, William's actual response to the
appearance of Ludlow is consistent with a preference for the existing mon-
archical constitution and an unmixed hostility to the radical and regicidal
strains of English political thought. In warning the Commons of Ludlow's
presence Tredenham reminded the House that they were dealing with a
"declared enemy to the king and kingdom."e
To what end do we raise taxes upon the people, but to support the
government? To what can these persons pretend, but to bring us
into the same anarchy as formerly? Now, we are setting things in
order, they are contriving to make us victims to their passions. I
am for the public security, and it is to that end I stand up.
69
The Commons adopted a resolution calling on the king to apprehend
Ludlow and to offer a reward for his capture. When the resolution was
presented to William, he is reported to have replied "[t]hat the address was
so reasonable, and the desire so just, that he would order a proclamation to
be issued out immediately for that purpose., 70 The proclamation was pub-
lished the next week offering a reward of £200 for the apprehension of
64. 12 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 257 (Leslie Stephens & Sidney Lee eds. 1963).
"Without being exactly a leveller or an anabaptist himself, he sympathised strongly with both parties,
and was trusted by them." Id at 256.
65. Barbara Taft, Return of a Regicide: Edmund Ludlow and the Glorious Revolution, 76 IST.
197, 197 (1991).
66. See 12 DIcTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 64, at 256-57; see also Tat, supra
note 65, at 217 (discussing reports that King William had requested Ludlow's presence In Ireland and
that Ludlow was fit for service in that region).
67. Taft supra note 65, at 217.
68. 5 PARL. HIST. ENG. 412 (1689).
69. IJd
70. d at413.
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Ludlow "who stands attainted of high treason by Act of Parliament for the
horrible and execrable murder of our Royal Grandfather [who] hath pre-
sumed to come into this our kingdom and there in privity lurketh."71 Be-
fore he was found, however, Ludlow escaped to Europe where he died in
Vevey in 1692.
The same anxiety about any association of the new government with
the constitutional experimentation of the past is illustrated by an incident
taking place two years later in Abingdon. In his charge to the Grand Jury,
Robert Atkyns, the Chief Baron of the Exchequer Court, was reported to
have said that the government of England was undoubtedly monarchical,
but that it was not a hereditary but an elective kingdom. The source of
this remarkable statement was one of the most prominent lawyers and ju-
rists in England. A third generation barrister, he was both son and brother
to former Chief Barons. He had been sacked from the Court of Common
Pleas by Charles II because of political differences and had assisted in the
defense of the opponents of the regime including Lord Russell who was
executed for participation in the Rye House Plot.
Atkyns published two pamphlets at the time of the Revolution. In
them he expressed clearly his political philosophy. On the central consti-
tutional issue of the Revolution, the capacity of the monarch to act in sig-
nificant ways independently of the houses of Parliament, he expressed no
doubt "None but the lawmaker can dispense with the law, not he that hath
but a share in the legislature."73 Indeed, he was later to claim that the
coronation oath effectively demoted the king's authority below that of the
Lords and Commons as he was obliged by it to assent to such laws as they
proposed.74
Naturally, Atkyns welcomed the Revolution. In the convention he
served as one of the peers' legal advisers and was consulted by the new
king on the best way to turn the Convention into a genuine Parliament.*5 In
April of 1689, William appointed him to the Exchequer Court and it was in
his judicial capacity that he addressed the grand jurors of Abingdon. His
naked concession of the facts of the Revolution sent a shudder through
Westminster. In July of 1689, the judges going on circuit were lectured by
George Treby, the Attorney-General, at the king's order to tell the people
that "this government has the greatest legal confirmation that it was capa-
71. Public Records Office SP 44/13 Proclamations Vol. 6, No. 39.
72. See CORINNE COMSTOCK WEsOMN & JANELE RENFROW GREENBERG, SUBECTS AND
SOvEREIGNs 238 (1981).
73. Id For a background of Alkyns' views on the power of the monarhy, s generally Id el 235-
40 & 361-63; 1 DIcTONARYOFNATIONALBIOGRAPHY703 (Leslie Stephens & Sidney Lee eds. 1963).
74. See WEsTON & GREENBERG, eupr note 72, at216.
75. See Lois G. Schwocrcr, Th Transformation of the 1669 Conventton Into a Parllamnt, 3 PApl.
HisT. ENG. 57, 57-8 (1994).
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ble of."76 In June the minutes of the Council meeting record a request to
the Attorney General to see "what can be done to Atkyns for this charge."
Subsequently Nottingham, the Secretary of State, wrote to a Mr. Edward
Pococke asking for an investigation and account of the charge "which is
represented as containing matters destructive to the government and very
pernicious to the peace of it." Pococke responded confirming the subver-
sive character of Atkyns' speech." It was apparently decided, however to
let the matter rest and Atkyns remained on the bench for another three
years.78  The promptness and thoroughness with which the matter was
taken up, however, is a further indication of the government's determina-
tion to maintain its legal character.
This attitude was manifested even on occasions when the security of
the regime was thought to be at stake. During the Revolution and in the
early weeks of the new government the courts had ceased to function.
Some of the judges of James II had fled and others, for obvious reasons,
had been discouraged from exercising their judicial functions. Hilary Term
in January, 1688-89 was not held, a fact which was to cause no little incon-
venience.79 Another consequence of the cessation of judicial authority,
however, may have been regarded as providential by the new regime.
During this most fragile of periods the effective government, administered
by William both before and after he had become king, could and did round
up people and hold them without the risk of an appeal to the judiciary for
their release. But with the reopening of the courts, it was to be expected
that writs of habeas corpus would be sued out again. On March first, the
king sent a message to the Parliament, noting that such detentions were
essential for the security of the settlement, but assuring them that he was
"'unwilling to do anything but what shall be fully warranted by law." He
asked for their advice as to how to deal with this dilemma. A bill was
quickly proposed to allow the king to commit "for two or three months"
such persons as "he shall suspect to be obnoxious... without the benefit of
habeas corpus.
'8
76. 2 ROGER MORICE, ENT'RINo BooK, BEING AN HISTORICAL REGISTER OF OCCURRENCES
FROM APRIL, ANNO 1677 TO APRIL 1691, at 591 (July 2, 1689) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Dr. Williams's Library, London) (Permission is granted by the Director of Dr. Williams's Library on
behalf of the Trustees to use and quote from Morrice's Ent'ring Book.).
77. See 3 REPORT ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE LATE GEORGE ALLAN FINCH 138, 149, 396 (Hist.
Manuscripts Commission Rep. No. 71, 1957). The anomaly of accommodating the political justifica-
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The suspension of habeas corpus was, no doubt, a bitter remedy. The
Whig and former Lord Mayor, Sir Robert Clayton, who supported it, noted
that "[h]ad it not been for the Habeas Corpus Act, there had not been many
of us here now; we had been dead and rotten in prison."3' But it was
mainly Tories who hesitated. Clarges advised rather that "great security"
should be demanded for the prisoners' appearance "than that Bill [the Ha-
beas Corpus Act] should be entrenched upon; a thing so sacred."82 To deal
with the problem by setting high bail, however, was too reminiscent of the
"violation of your liberties... in the late king's time30 and William in his
message to the House had reminded it of the grievance against excessive
bail in the Declaration of Rights.84 Still others suggested that the House's
advice to the king to continue to detain the disaffected would be sufficient
without legislation. Moreover, when the Whig William Pultney argued
that ajudge asked to release an applicant on a writ of habeas corpus could
not very well refuse just because "the House of Commons have advised the
king otherwise," Heneage Finch remarked that no action at all was really
necessary, since "as there are no judges yet appointed, they can have no
writs and so no necessity of bailing them immediately.' The bill, how-
ever, received a first and second reading and was committed all in one day
and, when it was brought up again on the fourth, all serious opposition had
disappeared. Minor amendments were proposed, but the only successful
one was an explicit statement that the act should not be understood to
abridge the privilege of members of Parliament."
The act, as finally passed, allowed the king or privy council to detain
"without bail or mainprize" any person for "suspicion of high treason or
treasonable practices" until May twenty-fifth. Moreover, until that day,
"noe judge or other person shall bail or try any such person... any law or
statute to the contrary notwithstanding.' m The suspension of judicial re-
course was renewed in May and again in the autumn of 1689. This me-
ticulous attention to, and the earnest debate concerning what President Lin-
coln, two centuries later, also in emergency circumstances, would call a
law "made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that practi-
cally it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent" demonstrates the
solicitude of the revolutionaries for the forms of law.
81. Id at 156.
82. Id at 155.
83. Id.
84. See I at 154.
85. Id. at 156.
86. Id. at 156.
87. See 1. at 158-59.
88. 1688, 1 W.&M.,ch. 11 (Eng.).
89. See HORWITZ, szqra note 22, at 45.
90. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, MESSAGE TO CONGRESS IN SPECIAL SEsSION (July 4, 1861) rprined n 5
THE COUCrED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1832-1865, at 430 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1974).
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A final example confirms the craving for legality which characterized
the revolutionary government established in 1688-89. One of the most
vexing problems for the new regime was the character and extent of the
oaths of support it would require, The question arose immediately upon
the decision to make William and Mary king and queen. The traditional
oath called for a declaration of loyalty to the king as "lawful and rightful."
That was an oath many of the men who acquiesced in the Revolution could
never take to this king and queen. Many had justified their part in the
Revolution by reference to an ill defined but venerable concept-that of
the de facto monarch. Under this theory it was permissible to adhere, at
least temporarily, to an unlawful ruler who was in thorough control of af-
fairs.9' But it was something else to acknowledge explicitly a legal title
which they knew was false. When the Speaker of the Lords, the Marquis
of Halifax, stated that refusal to impose such an oath would subvert the
new monarchs' title, Lord Danby wanted to know "if the Lord in the chair
wished to argue him into pejury."92
A compromise was worked out in which new oaths of loyalty would be
required but they would omit the critical references to legality. The offer
of the crown and Declaration of Rights set forth the new text: "I, A.B., doe
sincerely promise and sweare [t]hat I will bee faithfull and beare true
[a]llegiance to their Majesties, King William and Queen Mary. Soe help
me God." It was significant for two omissions. No reference was made
to the "rightful and lawful" title of the king and queen. Nor was there in-
cluded a promise of continuing loyalty to their "heirs and successors."
94
This streamlined oath allowed scrupulous members of the Convention
to act on the basis of the de facto theory acknowledging a duty to authori-
ties not sanctioned by law. In supporting the change, the Earl of Notting-
ham acknowledged that, while William's title was not legal, a subject
"must now owe and expect his protection from William as king de facto." 95
The oath, as Charles Mullet has written, "was not declaratory of any title.
It merely specified what the oath taker would do."96 But since it only
specified appropriate behavior in a particular set of circumstances, it was
an inherently flawed foundation for the new settlement. It was profoundly
ambiguous as to the proper response to a reassertion of authority by the
prior, lawful, regime--the most serious threat to the new settlement. In
91. The theory had received more or less official recognition In a statute of Henry VII exempting
from treason prosecution a person who had aided a king "for the time being." 1494, 11 Hen. 7, ch. I
(Eng.).
92. JONES, supra note 25, at 36 (citing Ballard MS 45, fol. 27 (Bodlelan Library)).
93. DECLARATION, supra note 4, see. 3, para. 2.
94. le
95. HOwn, supranote 17, at 82.
96. Charles Mullet, Religlon, Politics and Oaths in the Glorious Revolution, 10 REV. OF POL. 462,
466(1948).
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February the Earl of Clarendon asked the Earl of Chesterfield, whether he
would subscribe to the new oaths. Chesterfield "thought he should, look-
ing upon them to signify no more than that he did swear to pay him all law-
ful obedience, which was nothing if ever King James came back again.
For he said he was of my opinion that he could not be absolved from his
allegiance whenever he was in a capacity of paying it."' '
As the Declaration changing the oaths did not have the force of law,
the issue arose again in connection with the effort of the Convention to
transform itself into a Parliament. By existing law no one could sit in Par-
liament without taking the oaths of supremacy and allegiance to the king,
prescribed in statutes of 1562 and 1609, as well as satisfying the Test Act
of 1678, 98 by declaring against Catholic beliefs and practices. 9 Naturally
no member of the Convention had taken these oaths. The statute making
the Convention a Parliament dispensed with the requirements but it did so
by taking the most conservative legal approach available. After stating that
the assemblies of Lords and Commons in the Convention constituted a
genuine Parliament, the act stated that the Oath and Test acts relating to the
qualification of members of Parliament were "hereby repealed to all intents
and purposes." But, as this repeal, if it were effective at all, would nor-
mally be construed as prospective only, the act went on to provide a sub-
stitute and retroactive technique for qualifying the sitting members. The
members of "this present Parliament" were to subscribe to the Test Oath,
the new oath of allegiance (the oath from the Declaration, restated verba-
tim in the statute), and a combined and radically condensed version of the
old anti-papal oaths of the reigns of Elizabeth and James I. Such actions
"shall be good and effectual to all intents and purposes as if the said oaths.
. . had been taken in such manner and at such time as by the said [prior] act
or acts or any of them, they are required."' O° No verbal formulation could
overcome the basic impossibility of giving this statute legal effect under
the prior rules. It is instructive, however, to note the pains the drafters took
to connect their actions to those prior rules. They did not merely change
the rules for parliamentary qualification. They formulated new oaths and
then attempted to enact that these oaths should, in law, operate as the prior
oaths for the purposes of allowing them to make the changes. Few events
in the course of the Revolution reveal so plainly the intensity with which
these statesmen wished to maintain, even in the teeth of insuperable obsta-
cles, the continuity of the rules of law.
What can account for this unquenchable thirst for legality? Every legal
system has a beginning in time-a point where its own justification must
97. CLARENDON CORRESPONDNCE, supra note 16, nt 264.
98. See 1562-23, 5 Eliz., ch. 1, §§ 8-16 (Eng.); 1558-59, 1 Eiz. 1, ch. 1, § 19 (Eng.); 1605-56,7
lam. 1, ch. 6, (Eng.); 1605-56,3 Jam. 1, ch. 4. § 9 (Eng.).
99. 1678,30Car.2,ch. I,star2,(Eng.).
100. 1688, 1 W. & M., ch. I., (Eng.).
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be political and not legal. The institution of that system must be, at the
same time, a rejection of the regime it displaces. Consequently one might
expect those who engage in such action to scorn the legal artifacts of the
discarded constitution. This is, indeed, sometimes the case. In 1917 Lenin
relished the illegality of the Bolshevik Revolution which he unabashedly
referred to as a "direct 'usurpation." ' 01 But things are not always so clear.
Every new regime must conform to critical social and political values in
the population it intends to govern. Sometimes, however, a core value in
such a society is the value of legality itself. When that is the case we can
expect the kind of paradoxical appeal to legality illustrated by the Revolu-
tion of 1688-89.
In 1688 Britain, the political nation was law-saturated. Howard Nen-
ner has shown how the psychology of the common law dominated political
debate in the seventeenth century:
The law was the one constant in an era otherwise marked by con-
stitutional uncertainty and political disarray. It afforded the one
structure, both institutional and intellectual, which rendered the is-
sues intelligible and which provided a forum for political debate.
Never in question were the existence and utility of a rule of law...
As the century progressed, the place of law in politics became
even more important. Force as a lever of political control no
longer seemed to be a creditable option. It had been supremely
difficult to lay two civil wars to rest, and to restore a legitimate
king to his rightful throne. A repetition of that process and of the
mistakes that would make it necessary was almost unthinkable. It
was thus that the fear of anarchy and the spectral horror of regicide
were more than sufficient after 1660 to deter men from any course
that might impel them once more to inconsiderate action."°
How, in such an environment, can one make a revolution? The an-
swer, as the remarkably successful results of 1688-89 testify, is very care-
fully. At every point the departures from law were minimized and dis-
guised. William III, as much as any of his subjects, understood the neces-
sity for this approach. He was, as his biographer notes, "no Cromwell, no
Napoleon, no Lenin .... It is not possible to make him into anything re-
sembling a true revolutionary."'1 3 In this he was faithful to his own dispo-
sition but he was also adapting himself to the dominant culture of the king-
dom he aspired to rule.
101. See J. BuNYAN & IL FISiER, THE BOLSHEvIK REVOLUTION, 1917-1918: DOCUMENTS AND
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